NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 27 | Number 4

Article 10

6-1-1949

Evidence -- Confessions -- Admissibility Thereof
Robert Perry Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert Perry Jr., Evidence -- Confessions -- Admissibility Thereof, 27 N.C. L. Rev. 552 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol27/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

by a power company renders less important the distinction often drawn
in private tort cases between willfulness and negligence on the part of a
defendant 15 and the effect of possible laches or acquiescence on the part
of the plaintiff.' 6
The decision in the principal case is supported by the few decided
7
cases in this field.1
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.
Evidence-Confessions-Admissibility Thereof
Prior to 1942, when the famous McNabb decision' was banded down,
the law as to the admissibility of confessions had been that such an
2
instrument was admissible if voluntarily made and inadmissible if not.
said by way of dictum: "If this were a controversy respecting a private way I

would not hesitate to deny the mandatory injunction . . . but it is manifest that,
by reason of the relation which the complainant bears and its duty to the public,
a judgment for damages would be totally inadequate to meet the situation."
" Clough v. Healy & Co., 53 Cal. App. 397, 200 Pac. 378 (1921); Bauby v.
Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927)'; Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D.
Realty Co., 124 Conn. 191, 199 At. 106 (1938); Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass.
361 (1880) ; Walter v. Danisch, 133 N. J. Eq. 127, 29 A. 2d 897 (1943).
1 In the following cases injunction was refused because of the plaintiff's
laches or acquiesence: Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D. Realty Co,, supra note
15; Perry v. Hewitt, 314 Mass. 346, 50 N. E. 2d 48 (1943) (use of right-of-way
by defendant for about 44 years) ; Levi v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry., 193 Mass.
116, 78 N. E. 853 (1906) (facts not clear but plaintiff appears to have "unreasonably" delayed in protecting his rights); Starkie v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188, 29
N. E. 770 (1892) ; Andrews v. Cohen, 163 App. Div. 580, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1028
(1914) (defendant told plaintiff that he intended to build passway over plaintiff's
easement and plaintiff made no objection then or during construction).
17 Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926)
(five-room
house built fifteen feet over on right-of-way which plaintiff had acquired for the
maintenance of its power lines, ordered removed) ; Willingham v. Georgia Power
Co., 193 Ga. 801, 20 S. E. 2d 83 (1942) (lumber packed on land over which plaintiff had easement to construct and maintain its power lines, ordered removed);
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (Court of Appeal of La.,
1947) (frame house built over plaintiff's high pressure gas line upon plaintiff's
easement, same result); Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124
W. Va. 118, 19 S. E. 2d 217 (1942) (sand and gravel placed upon easement
which plaintiff used for maintenance of its water pipe lines, same result) ; Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) (buildings,
fences and other structures were ordered removed from plaintiff railroad's easement) ; cf. Babler v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. Supp. 10 (E. D. Mo. 1940)
(not a suit for injunction but plaintiff was held to have the right to maintain a
building over the defendant's pipe lines).
1318 U. S. 332 (1942).
'E.g., Lisenba v. United States, 314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; Wan v. United States,
266 U. S. 1 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896); Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51 (1895) ; State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19,
40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946); State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856) ; State v. Roberts,
12 N. C. 259 (1827); Rex. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234
(1783). That this had been the test in England even before 1775 see Rex v. Rudd,
1 Leach 115, 118, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (1775). "The instance has frequently
happened, of persons having made confessions under threats or promises: the consequence as frequently has been that such examinations and confessions have not
been made use of against them on their trial."
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The tests used in determining "voluntariness" varied,3 but the ultimate
fact of admissibility or inadmissibility was always decided by their end
result,4 the theory being that the voluntary confession warranted the
greatest credibility because it flowed "from the strongest sense of guilt," 5
while an admission involuntarily made was rendered untrustworthy as
evidence for lack of spontaneity.6 Moreover, quite apart from the
evidentiary requirement of trustworthiness, the involuntary confession
was invalidated by the mandate of fair play called for by the due process
7
provision in the federal constitution.
In the McNabb decision, however, the United States Supreme Court
took an abrupt departure from the above rule and supplemented it with
a new test of its own devising. In reversing a lower federal court conviction,8 that court found that illegal detention in violation of the prompt
arraignment statutes,9 when accompanied by long-continued questioning,
was enough to render inadmissible an apparently voluntary confession
obtained during the detention. Purposely sidestepping the constitutional
In fact, different tests could sometimes, be applied in the same case, depending on whether the voluntary nature of the confession was being attacked on
evidential or constitutional grounds. Lisenba v. United States, 314 U. S.219, 236
(1941). Generally, however, hope-of reward or fear of physical harm instilled in
the confessor by his captors were the controlling factors. Bonner v. State, 55
Ala. 245 (1876) ; State v. Thoml5son, 227 N. C. 19, 40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946) ; State
v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443.(1856); Rex. v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160
(1775). See Lisenba v. United States, supra at 240; Wilson v. United States, 162
U. S.613, 623 (1896); State'v. Andrew, 61 N. C. 205, 206 (1867). But some
courts did not consider the absence of these factors conclusive proof of voluntariness. Wan v. United States, 266 U. S.1, 14 (1924). "In the Federal courts
the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in
law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made."
"See note 2 supra.
'Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (1783) ; State v.
Biggs, 224 N. C. 23, 27, 29 S.E. 2d 121, 123 (1944).

'E.g., 3 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§822 (3d ed. 1940); Lisenba v. United States,

314 U. S.219 (1941) ; State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856) ; Rex v. Warickshall,
1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
"The aim of the requirement of due.process is not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether
true or false.... If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury
on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an accused person results
in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case can stand no
better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial."
Lisenba v. Unted States, 314 U. S.219, 236, 237 (1941); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S.227 (1939) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.278 (1935).
' McNabb v. United States, 123 F. 2d 848 (C. C. A. 6th 1941).
' 28

STAT.

416 (1894), 18 U. S. C. §595 (1926).

"It shall be the duty of the

marshal, his deputy, or other officer, who may arrest a person charged with any
crime or offense, to take the defendant before the nearest United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a
hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial. . . ." [Repealed, 62 STAT. 992
(1948). See FED. R. CRimr. P., 4 and 5] ; 48 STAT. 1008, 5 U. S. C. 300a (1934)
".... the person arrested shall be immediately taken before a committing officer."
[Repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).] North Carolina has the same statutory requirements. N. C. Gray. STAT. §§15-24, 46 (1943).
However, none of these statutes provide penalties in .case of non-compliance.
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issue, it based its opinion entirely upon its broad power to prescribe
rules of evidence for federal courts,' 0 and left undecided the question as
to whether the confession was, in fact, voluntary.
Clearly, then, a new rule to be applied by federal court judges in
determining competency of confessions had been formulated, but it
was not clear what that rule was." The court pointed out that the
"circumstances" of the case were such that a confession obtained thereunder would be inadmissible, 12 but with apparent purposefulness it limited itself to a recital of those circumstances, singling out none as the
hub around which its important new decision revolved.
Most lower courts thought that the Supreme Court had placed the
emphasis on the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
arraignment statute, that such failure was the controlling circumstance,
and accordingly held that, under the McNabb case, any confession obtained prior to compliance with the statute would be inadmissible.'"
However, this interpretative position was soon made untenable by
the later case of United States v. Mitchell.'4 There, an early-acquired
confession, obtained spontaneously and within the reasonable time
awarded arresting officers before they are expected to arraign a suspect,
was held admissible despite a subsequent illegal detention, the court saying, "Here there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of any legal rights .... 1
Cast again upon a sea of doubt, the lower courts could now swim
in but two directions. They could use the above quoted language from
10 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 341 (1942).
11
Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679
(1944) ; see Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting inUpshaw v.United States, 69 S. Ct.
170,12174 (1948).
McNabb v.United States, 318 U. S.332 (1942).
".

..

we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners

inthe circumstances disclosed here must be excluded." At p.341.
"The circumstances inwhich the statements . . . were secured reveal a plain
disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress upon Federal law officers." At p.344.
"... the circumstances under which evidence was secured are not irrelevant
inascertaining itsadmissibility." At p.346.
. "We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence
secured under the circumstances revealed here." At p.347.
2' Mitchell v.United States, 138 F. 2d 426 (App.D. C. 1943) rev'd, 322 U. S.
65 (1943) ; Runnels v.United States, 138 F.2d 346 (C.C. A. 9th 1943) ; United
States v.Hoffman, 137 F. 2d 416 (C.C. A. 2d 1943) ; United States v.Haupt,
136 F. 2d 661 (C.C. A. 7th 1943); see United States v. Grote, 140 F. 2d 413
(C.C. A. 2d 1944); cf. Gros v. United States, 136 F. 2d 878 (C. C. A. 9th
1943); United States v.Keegan, 141 F. 2d 248 (C. C. A. 2d 1944). Contra:
United States v.Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679, 685 (E.D. Wash. 1943), "Ihave reached
the conclusion that the Supreme Court inthe McNabb case added to the various
tests to be taken into consideration by the trial judge a new one, that of whether
or not a man was promptly taken before the United States Commissioner."; see
Tooisgah v. United States, 137 F. 2d 713, 715 (C. C. A. 10th 1943).
"322 U. S.65 (1943).
15 Id. at 70.
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the Mitchell case as a guide post and hold that there had to be shown in
addition to illegal custody a "purpose of illegally extracting evidence
from an accused and the successful extraction of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under psychological
pressure" ;16 or, by reading the Mitchell case as a mere modification of
the McNabb rule as they had previously conceived it, they could arrive
at the alternative conclusion that a voluntary confession is admissible if
obtained prior to the time detention becomes illegal, but inadmissible,
regardless of attendant circumstances, if elicited after the period of permissive custody has expired.
While the former interpretation won almost unanimous support from
the lower federal courts,1 7 the recent decision of Upshaw v. United
States1 8 clearly indicates that a majority of the supreme tribunal take
the contrary view. Defendant, in that case, was arrested on suspicion
of theft and, without being taken before a committing magistrate, was
detained and questioned intermittently for thirty hours, at the end of
which time he confessed. The question periods never lasted for more
than a half hour and there was never more than one officer present.
The District Court thought the confession was admissible because
the "detention of petitioner 'was not unreasonable under the circumstances as a matter of law,'"19 and Upshaw was convicted on the
strength of it. This conviction was sustained by the Court of Appeals20
on the theory that while the detention may have been unreasonable,
"there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention" 2 1 i.e., there was
no "successful extraction of . . . inculpatory statements by continuous
10Id.

at 67. Obviously, this interpretation of the McNabb case, as explained

by the Mitchell decision, was very similar to the unique pre-Mitchell interpretation
by Judge Schwellenbach in United States v. Klee (see note 13, supra). It was a
swing back toward the notion that voluntariness is the only test of admissibility
and amounted to a holding that the McNabb case merely added illegal detention
for the purpose of securing a confession by psychological pressure as a consideration in determining the fact of voluntariness or involuntariness. Upshaw v. United
States, 168 F. 2d 167, 168 (App. D. C. 1948).
17E.g., Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (App. D. C. 1948), rev'd, 69
S. Ct. 170 (1948) ; Alderman v. United States, 165 F. 2d 622 (App. D. C. 1947) ;
Boone v. United States, 164 F. 2d 102 (App. D. C. 1947); Brinegar v. United
States, 165 F. 2d 512 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; Hasson v. United States, 158 F. 2d
330 (App. D. C. 1946); Akowskey v. United States, 158 F. 2d 649 (App. D. C.
1946); Blood v. Hunter, 150 F. 2d 640 (C. C. A. 10th 1945); Ruhl v. United
States, 148 F. 2d 173 (C. C. A. 10th 1945) ; Paddy v. United States, 143 F. 2d
847 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; accord, Wright v. United States, 159 F. 2d 8 (C. C. A.
8th 1947). But before the Mitchell case was decided, one court, with some prescience, had chosen the other alternative as being the true McNabb rule. United
States v. Keegan. 141 F. 2d 248 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
I869 S. Ct. 170 (1948).

'Old. at 171.
" Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (App. D. C. 1948).
21Id. at 169.
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questioning for "zany hours under psychological pressnre."' 22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 23 and reversed.
Stressing the mandates of the prompt commitment statute, the court
said, ". . . a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention
...whether or not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or
psychological.' "24 Thus the second alternative rule outlined above was
expressly adopted and the effect of the McNabb decision on the law of
confessions was made certain: A confession may be voluntary and yet
be inadmissible-it is inadmissible if secured while the confessor is
being illegally detained, though illegal detention subsequent to a confession has no effect upon it.
The McNabb rule has now passed through three interpretative
stages.2 5 It has been much maligned all along the way, 20 and its desirability is, indeed, open to serious question. Though obviously intended
to encourage federal law enforcement officers to comply with the commitment statutes by depriving them of any "fruits of their wrongdoing," 2 7 it may well be doubted that it will have the desired effect. As
a practical matter, confessions, however illegally obtained, and however
inadmissible in court, often aid greatly in procuring evidence otherwise
undiscoverable. This evidence, despite the incompetency of its source,
has always been competent itself. 28 Therefore, if the Supreme Court
is not prepared to go the further step and declare such evidence likewise inadmissible, it probably has not substantially destroyed the incentive to violate the statutes.
Moreover, even if the judicially imposed sanction for violation of
the sanctionless legislative mandate is effective, the cure may be much
worse than the malady. The salutary effect of a remedy which will
partially paralyze the protective arm of law enforcement is questionable,29 even though that remedy may be a sure cure for the sniffles
2 United States v.Mitchell, 322 U. S.65, 67 (1943). Italics supplied.
23334 U. S.842 (1948).
2469 S.Ct. 170, 172 (1948).
-See notes 13, 17 and 18, and cases there cited.
2 United States v. Haupt, 136 F. 2d 661 (C. C. A. 7th 1943) ; Waite, Police
Regulation by Rides of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. REV. 679 (1944) ; 56 HARv. L. REv.

1008 (1943); 40 ILL. L. Ray. 273 (1945); see Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in
McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 347-349 (1942)

and in Upshaw v.

United States, 69 S.Ct. 170, 172-183 (1948).
Upshaw v. United States, 69 S.Ct. 170, 172 (1948).
2.7
United States v. Richard, 27 Fed. Cas. 798, No. 16, 154 (C. C. D. C.
1823) ; United States v. Hunter, 26 Fed. Cas. 436, No. 15,424 (C. C. D. C. 1806) ;
State v. Riddle, 205 N. C. 591, 172 S.E. 400 (1934) ; State v. Herring, 200 N. C.
306, 156 S.E. 537 (1931) ; see Note, 53 L. R. A. 403 (1901).
8E.g.,

29 Waite, Police Regulatioi by Rides of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679, 690
(1944), quoting Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, "Modern criminals seldom operate alone

and this is particularly true with regard to the more serious violations. ...
Immediate arraignment of the first member of a criminal gang who is arrested,
with the resultant public record and publicity, would frustrate plans of enforce-
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of statutory non-compliance. All in all, it is difficult to see why direct
legislative action making violators of the statutes amenable to the criminal law would not be preferable to the indirect method of encouraging
compliance now being employed by the federal judiciary. It would seem
to be no answer to say that the effectiveness of such a legislative sanction
depends on the willingness of government attorneys to prosecute and
of juries to convict. To advance this argument is to admit that prosecutors willfully violate their solemn oaths of office-a crime in itself;
that juries do not honestly perform their functions as triers of fact;
and that the people, speaking through their elected representatives, are
helpless to prescribe an enforceable standard of conduct for their servants. If this be so, we should look to the very foundation of our
system of law enforcement and not undermine the structure still further
by turning avowed criminals loose to prey again upon society.
But whether desirable or undesirable, unless the McNabb rule finds
its way into the constitutional guarantee of due process, it does not
appear likely that the North Carolina Supreme Court will feel constrained to adopt it. This conclusion is supported not only by the fact
that since the McNabb case was decided our court has three times3 0

reaffirmed its previous stand that the sole test of admissibility is whether
the confession is voluntary and made without inducement, threat or
hope of reward, but also by a study of the closely analogous problem
of illegal search and seizure.
The federal rule has long been that evidence procured through illegal
search and seizure is inadmissible because obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibitions of the fourth amendment. 31 However, North
Carolina has steadfastly refused to allow the fact of illegality in method
32
of procurement to have any effect on the competency of evidence.
In fact, our court,33 in the interest of preserving admissibility, has gone
34
a step further and laid a very strict construction upon a statute which
is almost a codification of the federal rule.
ment officers to apprehend the other individuals and conspirators involved ...
Expediency rather than immediacy should be a determining factor in deciding how
soon in the public interest an individual taken into custody should be arraigned."
Sce Upshaw v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 170, 182 (dissenting opinion), "Officers
charged with enforcement of the criminal law have objected for the reason that
fear of the application of its drastic penalties deterred officers from questioning
during reasonable delays in commitment."
" State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19, 40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946) ; State v. Biggs,
224 N. C. 23, 29 S. E. 2d 121 (1944) ; State v. Harris, 222 N. C. 157, 22 S. E.
2d 229 (1942).
"'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
" State v. Shermer, 216 N. C. 719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1940); State v. McGee,
214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-27 (1943).
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It is to be hoped that these indications are true ones and that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will, in fact, persist in its refusal to
follow the federal example.
ROBERT PERRY, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Realignment
of Parties in Corporate Derivative Suits
A New York stockholder in a New York corporation brought a
derivative suit against a citizen of Kentucky. The corporation was
joined as a defendant in accordance with the practice in derivative suits.
The complaint alleged that the officers in control of the New York Corporation had wrongfully transferred shares to the Kentucky defendant
in exchange for some worthless property. The Kentucky defendant
sought dismissal for lack of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff
stockholder, a citizen of New York, and his New York corporation.
The plaintiff conceded the apparent absence of diversity but contended
that the court should sustain diversity jurisdiction by realigning the
New York corporation as a complainant, since the action was on behalf
of that corporation.
. The court ref used to realign on the ground that the complaint showed
that managing powers of the New York .corporation had fradulently
conspired with the other defendant, therefore the corporation was a
rightful and necessary party defendant and could not be regarded
otherwise.'
The problem of realignment is of particular significance in corporate
derivative suits, in view of the facts that jurisdiction in such cases is
usually based on diversity of citizenship, 2 the right sought to be enforced is a corporate right,3 and the corporation is an indispensable
party. 4 Logically, it would seem that the corporation should be aligned
1
Smallen v. Louisville Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Ky.
1948).

' See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518,
522 (1947) ("With possible rare exceptions, these actions involve only issues of
state law and . . . can get into federal courts only by reason of diversity of
citizenship of the parties.").
* Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., supra note 2 at 522
("The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not his
own but the corporations's.") ; Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F. 2d 550, 554 (C. C. A.
2d 1944); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §163 (1936) ("the mere fact that the shareholder appears as plaintiff ... does not change the substantial nature of the right
to be enforced or the judgment to be collected. Both the right and the judgment
belong to the ... corporation.").
'Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873); Hobbs v. Mitchell, 80 F.
2d 172 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) (held that it was collusive to leave out the corporation). See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 522 (1947).

